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Colbert

THE MARYLAND ACCESS TO JUSTICE STORY: INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT FIRST APPEARANCE
Douglas L. Colbert*
When faced with a government’s criminal prosecution, an
accused person’s best protection against loss of freedom rests within
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional guarantee to
counsel. A lawyer’s advocacy at a defendant’s first appearance
usually makes the difference between remaining in jail on an
unaffordable bail and regaining liberty before trial. Thus, people able
to afford a private lawyer invoke their right to counsel’s assistance
immediately upon learning that they or a loved one have been arrested
and will soon appear before a judicial officer on criminal charges.
Maryland’s
poor
and
low-income
defendants,
disproportionately people of color, have had a very different
experience when accused of a crime. Though the Bill of Rights and
Sixth Amendment guaranteed in 1791 that an accused “shall have the
assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution,” as of 2011, more than
220 years later, Maryland’s indigent defendants still appeared before a
judicial officer without legal representation when their freedom was
first at stake. In most Maryland counties, detainees waited at least
thirty days before a lawyer was assigned to their case. That changed
when the State’s highest court, the Maryland Court of Appeals, ruled
in 2012 and 2013 in DeWolfe v. Richmond I and II that indigent
defendants’ statutory and constitutional due process rights required
counsel at the initial appearance and subsequent bail review hearing.
In this Article, Professor Doug Colbert describes the sixteenyear law reform effort in which Maryland Law School’s Access to
Justice clinical students, pro bono lawyers, and proponents of change
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succeeded in establishing indigent defendants’ right to counsel at
initial appearance and other pretrial bail reforms.
INTRODUCTION
Having moved from New York City to join the Maryland Law
School faculty in August 1994, I looked forward to the challenge of
clinical teaching and supervising law students’ representation of
indigent defendants in another state’s legal system. While I brought
ten years of clinical experience and two decades of defending New
York’s poorest population as a former Legal Aid criminal defense
lawyer, I had a lot to learn in moving to a new jurisdiction. Unlike the
unified procedures in the federal justice system, each state’s practices
could vary significantly and I knew nothing about Maryland court
procedures. Still, I thought I could count on the same baseline –
namely my belief that the Supreme Court’s constitutional right to
counsel rulings thirty years earlier in Gideon v. Wainwright1 and then
Argersinger v. Hamlin2 would guarantee counsel once a criminal
prosecution commenced.
I was wrong. Unlike New York City where indigent
defendants could count on an assigned counsel’s representation before
a judge within twenty-four hours of arrest, Maryland detainees
typically waited more than thirty days before an assigned lawyer
defended their freedom.3

1

372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))
(guaranteeing counsel at felony trials and emphasizing the importance of “the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings” to ensure that the trial right
is meaningful).
2
407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the constitutional right to counsel to misdemeanor
trials where defendants faced the loss of freedom and to pre-trial negotiations and
pleas). See also, The Constitution Project Nat’l Right to Counsel Comm., Don’t I
Need a Lawyer, Pretrial Justice and The Right to Counsel at First Judicial Bail
Hearing, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT 8, n28 (2015),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RTCDINAL_3.18.15.pdf.
3
See Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really
Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2002). Only two Maryland counties, Montgomery
and Harford, guaranteed a public defender’s representation at a bail hearing typically
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After the landmark decision in Gideon, Maryland’s indigent
population would wait fifty years before the State’s highest court held
in 2013 in DeWolfe v. Richmond (“Richmond II”) that the
constitutional due process right to counsel included a lawyer’s
representation at an accused’s first appearance before a judicial
officer.4 Until that ruling, and the statutory guarantee that came the
previous year from DeWolfe v. Richmond (“Richmond I”),5 Maryland
prosecuted low-income defendants without a defense lawyer present at
the critical moment when judicial officers decided to incarcerate or
order liberty for accused persons awaiting trial.6 Delaying counsel’s
advocacy until after the bail ruling effectively meant automatic onemonth postponements until the defendant’s next court appearance and
a lengthy jail stay for detainees unable to afford bail.7 During this
period of incarceration, many lost their jobs and homes, missed
school, and suffered separation from family.
The successful Richmond litigation followed years of sustained
law reform endeavors spearheaded by Maryland Law School’s Access
to Justice Clinic that began during the clinic’s maiden year in 1997 to
1998. After legislative and administrative efforts between 1999 and
2005 achieved partial successes but fell short of guaranteeing counsel,
held 2-5 days after arrest. Id. at 1770 n.155. Maryland defendants ordinarily faced
thirty-day and longer postponements before next appearing in court. Id. at 1731 n.54.
4
76 A.3d 1019, 1026 (Md. 2013). The Maryland Constitution provides “that in all
criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation
against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to
prepare for his defense; to be allowed counsel.” MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights,
art. XXI (2014). Moreover, the due process clause of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights reads: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned…or deprived of his
life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”
MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. XXIV (2014).
5
76 A.3d 962, 965 (Md. 2012) (holding that indigent defendants’ statutory right to
counsel guaranteed representation at the initial appearance and bail review stage of a
criminal proceeding). Following the high court’s decision on January 4, 2012, the
Maryland legislature responded by amending the Public Defender statute and
eliminating Richmond I’s statutory right to legal representation at the defendant’s
initial appearance before a District Court Commissioner. Representation commenced
at the bail review hearing. S.B. 422, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
6
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1728, 1732 & n.57.
7
See, e.g., id. at 1731 n.54. The District Court’s computerized procedure scheduled
the next possible court appearance for one month later. Depending on courts’
availability, detainees could wait longer periods.
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clinic students and pro bono lawyers turned to a litigation strategy and
filed a class action suit for right to counsel at first appearance in
November 2006. During the next eight years, the Richmond legal
team returned three times to Maryland’s Court of Appeals before a
majority of judges declared that the State’s constitutional due process
guarantee entitled poor people to representation at initial bail
hearings.8 Even after Richmond’s constitutional victory, however,
nearly another year passed before a temporary, twelve-month
implementation plan commenced on July 1, 2014.9
This Article recounts Maryland’s ongoing saga to give
meaning to Gideon’s ideal of equal access to counsel and the promise
of representation to “any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer”10 and faces the loss of liberty before trial and prior to a
finding of guilt.
Part I begins just before the start of the 1994-95 school year
when I first observed a Maryland bail review hearing. This section
explains the transition from teaching a traditional criminal defense
clinic to developing an Access to Justice Clinic where student-lawyers
would focus on early representation of indigent defendants. Three

8

Richmond v. Dist. Court of Maryland, 990 A.2d 549, 549 (Md. 2010); Richmond I,
76 A.3d 962, 965, 983; Richmond II, 76 A.3d 1019, 1026.
9
Steve Lash, Top Court Weighs Start Date For Lawyers-At-Bail Requirement,
MARYLAND DAILY RECORD, (May 6, 2014),
http://thedailyrecord.com/2014/05/06/top-court-weighs-start-date-for-lawyers-atbail-requirement/#ixzz3QVpJuxbU. Ian Duncan, First Defendants Get Lawyers at
Bail Hearings in Maryland, THE BALTIMORE SUN, (July 1, 2014),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-07-01/news/bs-md-bail-lawyers-arrive20140701_1_douglas-colbert-court-system-lawyers. During the 2014 legislative
session, Maryland’s legislature balked at funding the Office of the Public Defender
to represent indigent defendants at first appearances. Fredrick Kunkle & John
Wagner, MD Senate Wants to Streamline Bail System, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Mar. 31, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpolitics/2014/03/31/2de47726-b943-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html.
Thereafter, the District Court Judiciary assigned “Richmond” panel lawyers to first
appearances throughout the State; each is paid an hourly $50 rate or $400 per eighthour shift. Following the initial appearance, public defenders continue
representation at the next bail review hearing. Steven Lash, Bail, Day 1: ‘Very Few
Glitches’, DAILY RECORD, (July 1, 2014) http://thedailyrecord.com/2014/07/01/day1-very-few-glitches/.
10
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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years later, Access to Justice student-attorneys began representing
detainees at the bail stage and engaged in law reform to enhance
justice for Maryland’s impoverished and low-income defendants.
Part II describes the first stage of the Clinic’s law reform
endeavor beginning in January 1998 and continuing until January
2006. During this eight-year period, students and a coalition of
proponents focused upon generating support for legislative and
administrative rule changes. Legislative bills focused on guaranteeing
counsel at the bail stage and limiting judicial reliance on money bail
and bail bondsmen that required economically-disadvantaged
defendants to pay non-refundable, ten percent fees.
Part III details the second period, stretching from 2006 to 2014,
and the transition to a litigation strategy that eventually led to the
Court of Appeals’ statutory and constitutional rulings in Richmond and
the implementation of counsel at initial appearance that followed.
Part IV concludes by analyzing the ongoing pushback against
indigent defendants’ right to counsel and reform measures eliminating
money bail and the commercial bondsman’s surety.
I. THE OUTSIDER’S VIEW OF MARYLAND PRETRIAL JUSTICE
A. The City Chain Gang
Weeks before I began teaching Maryland students in late
August 1994, I visited the Baltimore City criminal court designated for
bail review hearings and positioned myself in the front row. Here, I
expected to observe a District Court judge review the prior rulings of a
commissioner, who had presided at defendants’ initial appearance and
ordered money bail that detainees could not afford. By now, I had
become familiar with Maryland’s two-prong, procedural system where
within twenty-four hours following arrest, the jailed defendant would
appear before a District Court commissioner, typically a non-lawyer
empowered to release, set or deny bail for an accused.11 If still
incarcerated, a judge would review the commissioner’s decision at a
11

MD. RULE 4-213 (a) (2015); See MD. RULE 4-216 (c) (2015). "Judicial Officer"
refers to a District Court judge or commissioner. MD. RULE 4-102(f) (2015).
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second “bail review” hearing held the next weekday court session
between one and five days later.12
At first blush, it seemed Maryland’s “two bites at the apple”
provided additional protection for the accused whose lawyer could
take advantage of two opportunities to argue for pretrial release.
However, I had once again made the mistake of assuming that indigent
defendants could expect a lawyer’s representation. I soon learned that
only the private defense lawyer could argue twice for the paying client
while the indigent defendant, who lacked access to counsel, was left to
self-representation at the initial appearance and bail review hearings.
Additionally, I overlooked the impact of the first money bail ruling set
by the commissioners. Because detainees wanted to be released from
jail as soon as possible, many would use their limited financial
resources to pay the bondsman’s ten percent, non-refundable fee to
make that happen.13 Those unable to afford the fee or the money
amount remained in jail and prayed for a favorable bail review ruling.
As I waited for the judge to enter and take the bench, I looked
around the almost empty courtroom. Aside from court officers, I saw
only two people, a private lawyer and his client’s mother. That
seemed strange to me, considering the court docket included between
twenty and twenty-five named defendants.14 I wondered when the
public defender would arrive.

12

See MD. RULE 4-216.1 (a), (c) (2015). Judges’ bail review proceedings occurred
Monday through Friday. Defendants arrested Sunday through Wednesday appeared
within 48 hours of arrest. Defendants arrested on Thursday, however, would appear
the next day before a commissioner; those unable to post bail would wait four days
for a review hearing until Monday. On holiday weekends, bail review hearings
would occur on the following Tuesday, five days after arrest.
13
Maryland judicial officers rely on ordering a full 100% financial bond. For
defendants lacking cash savings to cover this full amount, or who do not own a home
with sufficient equity, the bondsman’s ten percent fee becomes their only realistic
choice. Bondsmen usually accept partial installment payments. Ian Duncan and
Justin Fenton, In Maryland Jails, Release Often Comes Down to Who can Pay,
THE BALTIMORE SUN, (Jan. 18, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-0118/news/bs-md-maryland-bail-reform-proposals-20140118_1_bail-system-bailbondsmen-initial-bail/3.
14
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1728.
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Once the judge appeared, the clerk called the private lawyer’s
case. Her precise and persuasive argument made me aware of the
value of having a lawyer advocate for pretrial release. The presence of
the client’s mother helped too. It was a priority that showed the judge
that the defendant had personal support and helped to alleviate
concerns regarding an accused’s future appearance. When family
cannot be present, informing the judge of having spoken to family or
friends who verified the client’s community ties and likelihood to
return makes it much easier for the lawyer to persuade a judge to grant
pretrial release.15 Since most Maryland defendants are arrested for
non-violent, lesser crimes16 – prosecutors indict only eight to nine
percent of arrestees charged with more serious or violent offenses17 –
lawyers’ advocacy often makes the crucial difference in gaining
detainees’ pretrial release.
After the judge ordered pretrial release for the private lawyer’s
client, the court clerk called the remaining jailed defendants on the
docket. I thought the judge might inquire about the missing public
defender but instead he indicated his readiness to begin. Then I saw a
startling sight.18 A group of twenty-five men entered the courtroom
from the door leading to jail. Moving together slowly and in a
shuffling-style, the men advanced until they settled in a vertical line
facing the judge. As I looked more closely, I could see each prisoner
handcuffed and shackled in leg irons. A loose metal chain wrapped
around each prisoner’s waist extended to the person in front and
behind the individual. I had never seen a chain gang before and
certainly not inside a courtroom. It was a powerful and frightening
sight, the historical imagery of which became even more alarming

15

“A defendant is entitled to be released before verdict on personal recognizance or
on bail, in either case with or without conditions imposed, unless the judicial officer
determines that no condition of release will reasonably ensure (1) the appearance of
the defendant as required and (2) the safety of the alleged victim, another person and
the community.” MD. RULE. 4-216(c).
16
Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1732 & n.55 (showing that in 1999, more than
ninety-one percent of Maryland defendants faced District Court criminal prosecution
for misdemeanor crimes).
17
Id. at 1732 & n.56 (showing that in 1999, 8.8% of Maryland defendants faced
felony indictment in Circuit Court).
18
Id. at 1728, 1733.
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upon noting that African-Americans comprised virtually the entire
group, aside from two White defendants.
A public defender never appeared. The judge explained to the
assembled group that anyone wanting a lawyer could apply for a
public defender after the hearing. He told them that if they were
found eligible for a lawyer, one would be appointed. The judge
indicated that each person had a right to speak at the bail review but he
advised against it, saying everyone would be wise to wait until talking
to a lawyer since anything said could be used as evidence at trial. The
judge then addressed each individual defendant, indicated the charge
and the bail amount, and asked whether the individual had anything to
say. Most remained silent, except the few who made damaging
admissions in an effort to minimize culpability and regain freedom.
One defendant asked to consult with a lawyer, “like they do in New
York.” The judge repeated that would happen later and require a
postponement because “that’s how we do things here.” The defendant
withdrew his request.
B. Maryland Law and Legal Culture Remembering the New
York City Experience
I remained seated long after the judge had completed calling
the cases and affirmed most of the commissioner’s prior decisions.19 I
had read that Maryland’s Public Defender Act20 entitled indigent
defendants to representation at “all stages of a criminal proceeding.”21

19

“Between 1994 and 1998, clinic students observed District Court bail hearings for
a two-week period on three occasions. They reported that, in the absence of counsel,
judges generally maintained commissioners’ prior bail conditions.” Id. at 1736 n.72.
Additionally, data compiled by law students and lawyers as a part of the Pretrial
Release Project, revealed that bail review judges in Baltimore City and Frederick
County reduced the commissioner’s bail ruling for only one out of four detainees,
while Harford County judges lowered bail for one out of six defendants. See THE
ABELL FOUND., THE PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S
PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL SYSTEM, 120 n.33 (2001) [hereinafter PRETRIAL
RELEASE STUDY].
20
MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A, section 4(d) (West, 1994).
21
Id. Seven years later in McCarter v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals
unanimously agreed that public defenders’ statutory duty to provide counsel
extended to indigent defendants’ initial appearance. 770 A.2d 195, 199–200 (Md.
2001). “All means all, and it encompasses the [defendant’s] August 13 th [initial
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The statute referred to the right of counsel at specific custodial
hearings.22 But these hearings, absent a lawyer’s advocacy, had
proceeded with little interruption and with detainees returning to their
cells in speedy fashion. Had the defense bar objected to incarceration
without representation? What explained public defenders’ absence at
this crucial stage of prosecution against jailed indigent defendants?
Being new to the state, I needed to learn more about the
Maryland pretrial process. I thought back to my New York Legal Aid
colleagues’ usual zealous advocacy when defending poor people’s
liberty at first appearance hearings (“arraignment”). Most considered
the arraignment to be their client’s most important event. Get a person
out of jail, they said, and you virtually assured most clients (who did
well on the outside) would avoid jail and stand a much better chance at
dismissal or acquittal if choosing to fight the charges. That customary
practice became the lawyer’s guidepost, as judges and jurors tended to
view the freed defendant more as a person entitled to remain in the
community rather than someone belonging in jail. And so, New York
defenders often congratulated themselves and each other’s valiant,
creative and frequently successful arguments on behalf of their client’s
pretrial freedom because they knew it would impact favorably on the
outcome of most cases.
But it was not always that way. Before the cultural change of
the early 1970’s, lawyers had been divided. Legal Aid veteran
attorneys clashed with newly-hired, law school graduates who had
insisted upon immediate change.
The experienced lawyers,
particularly the “star” trial lawyers, resented being told they should
take regular shifts at first appearances with the new kids on the block.
A cultural war nearly erupted between veterans accustomed to
appearance] proceeding regardless of its categorization.” Id. at 201. McCarter had
appeared without a lawyer at his initial appearance, where he waived his right to a
jury trial. The Court struck the waiver, holding that McCarter’s statutory right to
counsel required representation. Id. at 196–97, 199, 201. Despite the ruling,
Maryland indigent defendants remained without counsel until the high court’s 2013
ruling in Richmond v. DeWolfe, supra note 4.
22
MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A, section 4(d) (West, 1994). The McCarter Court referred
to the statutory language that specifically included custody proceedings involving a
person’s liberty. McCarter, 770 A.2d at 200–01. It added that “[t]he specific types of
proceedings listed in the statute and rule are for purposes of illustration only.” Id. at
201.
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defending one defendant after another, and the brand new lawyers
seeking to dismantle a system that they considered “assembly-line”23
justice.
Things became really heated when the more racially diverse,
newly-hired group of lawyers accused their all-White, elder colleagues
of being racist for failing to produce strong arguments at first
appearance arraignments for the disproportionately African-American
and Latino defendant population. The veteran defenders denied that
race had anything to do with their placing less faith in clients returning
to court, accepting most bail decisions, and focusing instead upon
persuading judges to offer “good deals.” Pleading guilty, often to lowlevel violation offenses – which was not considered a conviction under
New York law24 – in exchange for “time served” sentences and
regaining freedom became the seasoned lawyers’ cultural norm. But
the new attorneys saw it differently. They maintained that lawyers’
zealous advocacy at arraignment would result in a greater number of
clients being released and provide the client with a real choice to
exercise the right to trial rather than accept the often coerced plea.
In the end, each generation realized that they shared more in
common regarding client representation than their perceived
differences. The veteran New York lawyers witnessed how vigorous,
first appearance representation gained better results, improved
attorney-client relationships, and resulted in most clients returning to
court. The newly-hired attorneys understood that their strident, selfrighteous, know-it-all approach added to colleagues’ resentment.
Most shifted toward a team-building approach and witnessed changes,
as they applauded senior colleagues for presenting powerful arguments
for clients’ freedom.
In turn, the less experienced defenders
appreciated colleagues’ assistance in smoothing an argument’s rough
edges and learning to respect client choices. First appearance
representation became a forum for Legal Aid defense lawyers to

23

See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36, 58 (1972).
“‘Violation’ means an offense, other than a ‘traffic infraction,’ for which a
sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days cannot be imposed.”
N.Y. PENAL § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2015). “A sentence of imprisonment for a
violation shall be a definite sentence. When such a sentence is imposed the term
shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed fifteen days.” Id. § 70.15.
24
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employ proactive, effective advocacy that resulted in most clients’
release from jail.
For decades since Gideon, Maryland’s legal culture accepted
public defenders remaining on the sidelines at indigent defendants’
first appearance and bail hearings.25 Like New York’s evolution,
change would take time and required reexamining practices. When
asked to justify a lawyer’s absence, Maryland public defenders gave
different reasons. The State’s Chief Public Defender explained that
limited staffing made deployment difficult, but then noted his
uncertainty as to whether public defenders would make a difference at
early bail proceedings. He and other supervisors justified current
deployment by pointing to public defenders’ successful outcomes –
three out of five detainees had charges ultimately dismissed or not
prosecuted (“stetted”),26 while others pled guilty and received “time
served.” They believed that such favorable results would be assured
only for defendants who appeared, and jail ensured a detainee’s
presence. It all sounded reminiscent of New York City’s veteran
lawyers justifying their lack of vigorous representation at arraignments
by obtaining a favorable deal for in-custody defendants thereafter.
Unlike many New York City defendants, though, who lost one
to three days of liberty before returning to court, Maryland detainees
unable to post bail spent at least thirty days in jail before their next
appearance. Did the end result of dismissal or no prosecution justify
leaving indigent defendants without representation for such a lengthy
period? Certainly, no defender could imagine allowing a loved one to
remain in jail for one month without putting up a spirited argument for
their freedom.
Moreover, under New York procedure, defendants could
regain liberty by pleading guilty to a violation offense, which did not
count as a conviction and carried no collateral consequences. In

25

See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1729 & n.40 (describing Maryland criminal
defense lawyers’ awareness of the practice of no representation, and believing it
would continue).
26
Id. at 1756 & n.121. MD. RULE 4-248(a) (2015) (stating that prosecutors can
motion to postpone a trial; a charge may be rescheduled for trial at the request of
either party for one year, and thereafter only for good cause shown).
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contrast, Maryland’s least serious guilty plea – a misdemeanor – did
count: prior convictions often enhanced punishment for future
convictions and could preclude individuals from public or
government-assisted housing, job employment opportunities, and
eligibility for public benefits. 27
Would Maryland’s defenders see the advantages of firstappearance representation replacing the only system they had known?
As a new arrival to the Maryland justice system, I knew my colleagues
and students counted on my teaching a first-rate clinic and providing
the supervision needed to ensure student-lawyers’ highly competent
representation. I decided to let the disturbing practices of pretrial
justice rest and see whether students raised the issue of pretrial
incarceration of unrepresented clients.
I did not have to wait long.
C. From Trial Defense Clinic to Bail Representation
I joined Maryland Law’s faculty because of the school’s
substantial investment in clinical education. Most schools considered
“live” client-representation clinics too expensive.28 But Maryland had
gained legislative funding for its “Cardin requirement,” which
mandates that all students undertake clinical work before graduation.29

27

See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010) (explaining
that collateral consequences are additional penalties resulting from a criminal
conviction separate from the direct consequences of incarceration). “The most
prominent of these collateral consequences in the United States are exclusion from
public or government- assisted housing, employment-related legal barriers,
ineligibility for public benefits, and felon disenfranchisement.” Id. at 490.
28
Philip M. Genty, Essay: Clients Don't Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable InHouse Clinic and the Teaching of Empathy, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 273, 285 n.34
(2000) (noting that law school deans may question the value of expensive clinics
with direct client-representation).
29
See Michael Millemann, Implementing Maryland Law School’s Mandatory
Clinical Requirement, 47 MD. B. J. 46, 48 (2014) (describing how the University of
Maryland School of Law developed its mandatory clinical requirement after a 1988
study conducted by the Maryland Legal Services Corporation (MLSC) commission,
chaired by then-Congressman Benjamin Cardin, recommended that law schools
require students to provide legal assistance to the poor).
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The law school provides second- and third-year students a rich and
diverse selection of “live” client-based experiences. Similar to the
medical school model where interns and residents gain valuable skills
by assuming the doctor’s role and treating patients with senior
supervision, clinical law students represent actual clients facing legal
proceedings in Maryland’s civil and criminal courts. The Criminal
Defense Clinic, for example, gave student-lawyers the opportunity to
defend indigent people accused of misdemeanors and non-violent
felony crimes at trial or until a case concluded. Known as Rule 16
attorneys, Maryland’s highest court requires that student-lawyers
function with faculty supervision and maintain the same ethical
requirements as admitted attorneys.30
In my years of law school teaching, I became a huge fan of
clinical students performing at the highest level of excellence. With
very few exceptions, they impressed me with a willingness to serve
clients, to connect with their families and community, and to enhance
justice for disadvantaged populations. Most supervising faculty and
Rule 16 student-lawyers would agree that the intense, rewarding and
challenging clinic experience prepares students with the necessary
skills, support and encouragement to enter the legal profession and to
fulfill lawyers’ professional responsibility to enhance the
administration of justice.31 The close working relationship often leads
to a sharing of ideas that goes beyond a lawyer’s obligation to clients.
The Clinic’s incoming class in 1994 reflected an unusually
dedicated and hard-working group. Unlike many former New York
law students who applied to the criminal defense clinic to prepare for
becoming prosecutors, the Maryland students had a strong
commitment to criminal defense. During the first weeks, they
demonstrated an enviable work ethic that led to certification as Rule
16 attorneys. I took advantage of the Clinic’s relationship with the
Office of the Public Defender to arrange for students’ first client
assignments. Each client had been arrested for non-violent crimes,
released from jail and now awaited trial.

30

See MD. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR, Rule 16 (2015).
See MD. RULE 16-812, Preamble, Scope and Terminology (2015) (noting the
Maryland Lawyer’s Responsibilities).
31
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Students devoted substantial time to preparing for trial. They
located witnesses, developed a theory of the case, submitted motions,
prepared cross-examination of prosecution’s witnesses, and developed
opening and closing arguments. They enjoyed being lawyers.
Students’ readiness involved numerous rounds of practice. Their
dedicated work gained optimal results for most clients. While
criminal trials were rare, students’ preparation usually convinced
prosecutors to dismiss or not prosecute the charges.
I remember the joy students expressed when describing their
first client experience in class. They had gained self-confidence,
provided meaningful representation, and understood the difference
they had made for clients unable to afford private counsel. Many
recounted the growing attorney-client relationship that developed.
Clients had placed trust and confidence in the student-lawyer’s ability
to provide competent representation. From the student perspective,
they appreciated their new professional identity as an attorney for the
accused. Most spoke glowingly about what clients had taught them
and what they had learned as advocates.
One student shared a poignant conversation she had with her
client after the case successfully concluded. She did not realize the
impact that it would have upon the clinic’s future work:
I had submitted a motion to dismiss the charge
based upon the arresting officer’s unconstitutional
search. Before court began, I approached the
prosecutor and prepared to ask for dismissal. I had
just begun speaking when the prosecutor said, ’I
agree. Nice motion.’ I contained my excitement
and immediately walked to where my client was
sitting to deliver the good news. He breathed a sigh
of relief. Having spent a week in jail, he feared a
much longer sentence, if convicted of the four-year
maximum charge. After giving a big thank you, he
said something that has remained with me. ’Don’t
take this wrong but you and the students should see
us right away, and not wait one-to-two weeks after
arrest. Had you been there on day one, I probably
would have been released. Instead I lost my
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freedom, my job and my mom paid the bondsman
$500, money that we’ll never see again.’
In the lively discussion that followed, several students expressed
similar sentiments. They, too, had considered the consequences of
clients not having a lawyer at the outset and being deprived of liberty
and separated from family. Others reported defendants missing thirty
to forty days of school while in jail and then learning that charges
would be dismissed. One student said no one will return those days to
my client and he will probably have to repeat his senior year. A White
student referred to the Clinic’s almost exclusively African-American
and Latino clientele and doubted he would have been treated the same.
Another student recounted the excruciating choice a family must make
in deciding whether to pay bail from money designated for rent.
Some students asked whether they could begin representation
at the initial appearance or bail review hearing, while others hesitated.
They pondered the practical and logistical issues that might arise if the
Clinic changed. Thus began a series of spirited conversations that
eventually led the Baltimore City Administrative Judge to permit
criminal defense students to represent a small sample of detainees,32
who otherwise would have remained in jail waiting for representation
of counsel at the next court appearance.
During the Spring 1995 semester, this group broke new ground
by representing twelve incarcerated indigent detainees at city bail
review hearings.33 The results spoke volumes – nine detainees gained
release, four on recognizance and five others on reduced bail.34 Clinic
student research teams also gathered information about the statewide
practice of denying counsel. We learned that public defenders
appeared at bail hearings in only two of Maryland’s twelve judicial
districts, Montgomery County and Harford County. In Maryland’s
remaining jurisdictions, neither a public defender nor an assigned
lawyer represented indigent defendants’ before a judicial officer until
thirty-to-forty days following arrest. Students did a rough estimate of
the cost savings that could flow from successfully representing

32

See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1729 & n.41; See also infra pp. 17–18.
Id. at 1729 n.44.
34
Id.
33
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detainees within forty-eight hours of arrest: their calculations indicated
many millions of dollars in savings. The students began collecting
information in nearby states.35 That led to a fifty-state survey, which
revealed a crisis in the absence of representation at the bail stage. A
resulting publication included the survey and asserted that defendants’
constitutional right to counsel commenced at first appearances.36
When class concluded in May 1995, students and faculty both
agreed on a two-year plan to transform the Clinic into one that focused
on representation at bail. The objectives included gaining the law
school’s approval for a redesigned Access to Justice and Bail Clinic,
developing a collaborative model with judges and public defenders
that allowed student-lawyers to represent detainees, engaging in public
education, and publishing scholarly articles. The ambitious agenda
looked for assistance and cooperation from the academic and legal
community.
II. TRAVELING ALONG THE LAW REFORM PATH
A. The Formative Years: Faculty, Bar and Judicial Support
Shortly after the 1994-95 year concluded, the Dean of the law
school, Donald Gifford, conducted his customary end-of-year faculty
review. He felt that my “honeymoon” year had gone well and
generously asked what he could do to enrich my professional life and
productivity.
I began by sharing the students’ plan because curriculum
changes require faculty approval. With the Dean’s blessing, the
Criminal Defense Clinic could transition to the less conventional
Access to Justice and Bail Clinic. I explained that Rule 16 studentlawyers would gain more opportunities for courtroom argument, while

35

Id. at 1730, n.46.
See Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to
Council at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (asserting that the bail
determination is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding that requires states to
guarantee counsel’s advocacy and that not only does lack of representation at this
stage lead to a loss of freedom, but the incarcerated defendant is much more likely to
be convicted and receive a longer sentence).
36
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engaging in law reform projects that were intended to enhance justice
for indigent defendants. To make early representation a reality, we
would need cooperation from the judiciary, public defenders and
department of corrections. “Can you support us there, Dean?” I
gently asked. He smiled and replied: “It all sounds doable so far.”
I thanked the Dean and explained that changing a legal system
that had functioned without lawyers for so long would be the toughest
part. I remember saying that “we will need to educate the bar and the
public about counsel’s important role to protect people’s freedom and
to reduce jail costs, too. Too few know about lawyers’ absence when
people’s liberty is at stake.”
I went on to explain that most people are unaware of the
system’s reliance on bail bondsmen and money bonds that keep poor
and low-income people in jail at taxpayer expense, especially those
charged with non-violent or less serious crimes. Educational
endeavors might include opinion editorials, news articles, public talks,
scholarly reports and media coverage. I suggested that at some point
the practice of non-representation and reliance on money bail for
freedom must be changed on a permanent basis. That’s when I
expected to encounter strong opposition from vested interests, such as
the bail bond industry and others who want to maintain the status quo.
I expected clinic students would play a vital role in explaining how
these proposed changes enhance the administration of justice. Many
might regard their role in the reform process as one of their most
memorable learning experiences. I emphasized the Dean’s important
role throughout this process.
When I finished, the Dean was smiling broadly. His parting
words were perfect. “Just keep me informed…and do publish that
seminal law review article in a leading journal about poor people’s
constitutional right to counsel at the bail stage. I’d like to read it.”
Over the next two years, the pieces of the Access to Justice
Clinic began to come together. First, the Maryland Bar Association
invited me to become a board member of its Correctional Reform
Section, a prestigious group that included federal and state judges,
correction and parole board officials, and leading members of the bar
interested in issues related to jail overcrowding. At the following
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summer’s annual State Bar meeting in June 1996, Correctional Section
members organized a keynote panel discussion about pretrial justice
and bail reform. The following year, Section members approved a
right to counsel resolution and forwarded it to the State Bar
Association, asking that it embrace representation for indigent
defendants at bail.37 At its 1997 summer meeting, the Maryland State
Bar Association Board of Governors unanimously approved the
resolution.38 The Bar’s continued interest led Correctional Reform
Section members to present a similar resolution the following year to
the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Law Council. The
national resolution called upon all 50 states to guarantee representation
at bail hearings. In March 1998, the ABA Council, comprised of
judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers, unanimously recommended
that the ABA House of Delegates approve it too. Unlike the lengthy
process that typically accompanies a new bill, delegates voted to
support the resolution that August.39
Joining the State Bar and Correctional Reform Section,
Baltimore City judicial officials also demonstrated support for student
and lawyer representation of indigent detainees at the bail stage.
Administrative Judge Mary Ellen T. Rinehardt had previously
indicated her support for student advocacy at bail review hearings
during the Spring 1995 semester when clinic students began
advocating for pretrial release.40 Now, two years later, Judge
Rinehardt lent her strong endorsement when Maryland law faculty
considered the change to an Access to Justice Clinic. She pledged that
District Court judges would hear Rule 16 clinic students’ arguments at
bail hearings. During the formative years of 1996-1997, students and
faculty contributed to public understanding of poor people being
denied legal representation at bail hearings by participating in public
radio programs41 and contributing to Baltimore Sun news and op-ed

37

See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1730–31, 1731 n.49.
Id. at 1731 n.49.
39
A.B.A Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Delegates, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION (Aug. 1998),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/scla
id/20110325_aba_112d.authcheckdam.pdf.
40
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1729 n.41.
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Id. at 1731 n.52.
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articles.42 These early news reports would be the first of many articles
about inequities in Maryland’s pretrial justice system in the years to
come.
When the Maryland Law faculty approved changing the Clinic
to one that emphasized students providing counsel for unrepresented
detainees at bail hearings in April 1997, it paved the way for the
launch of the new Clinic the following school year. The 1998 Access
to Justice Clinic coincided with the Illinois Law Review publishing a
lead article, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to
Counsel at Bail Proceedings,43 which argued that indigent defendants’
constitutional right to counsel included the critical bail proceeding.
When the Access to Justice Clinic opened its doors in January 1998, it
welcomed an enthusiastic, over-capacity group of twelve law
students.44
B. A New Clinic and Legislative Reform
The first months of the 1998 Spring semester stand out for the
groundbreaking change that the Access to Justice Clinic brought to
Maryland’s pretrial justice system. The Rule 16 student-lawyers
successful representation of seventy-five detainees at Baltimore City
bail review hearings generated media attention and peaked legislators’
interest during the next legislative session in Annapolis.45 The
Maryland Bar Association-sponsored bill to guarantee representation
to indigent defendants held on money bail brought additional interest
during the January-to-April legislative session. In March, the Abell
Foundation committed initial funding for the non-profit Lawyers at
Bail (LAB) Project. Five months later, LAB’s twenty part-time
lawyers and five paralegals commenced representing eligible city

42

See Ivan Penn, Law Students Aid at Bail Reviews, BALT. SUN, Feb. 26, 1998, at
1B; Doug Colbert, For Want of a Lawyer, Many Do Time, BALT. SUN, April 7, 1996,
at 6F.
43
See Colbert, supra note 36.
44
The twelve enrolled students exceeded clinical professors’ recommended 8:1
faculty to student ratio. See David A. Santacroce & Robert R. Kuehn, Ctr. For The
Study Of Applied Legal Educ., The 2010-2011 Survey Of Applied Legal Education,
16 – 18 (2012) (identifying the most common student-teacher ratio for live clinics as
8 to 1).
45
See Penn, supra note 42.
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detainees charged with non-violent crimes at bail review hearings.46
Judge Rinehardt provided office space at the courthouse.47
The combined support of Maryland’s bar, judiciary,
corrections and law students contributed to a shared belief that change
might be coming soon to Maryland’s pretrial justice system. Judge
Rinehardt welcomed the Access to Justice students, who were eager to
address the gap in representation at bail hearings. Her commitment to
reduce pretrial jail overcrowding led to scheduling court sessions
where student-lawyers presented information that showed most
defendants posed little risk of flight or danger if released.48 The
students’ successful arguments gained release for seventy percent of
their clients awaiting trial.49 News articles captured the story and
showed the picture of African-American defendants thanking their
young law student-attorneys upon regaining freedom.50
The Maryland Bar Association authorized its legislative
lobbyist, Buzz Winchester,51 to initiate an educational campaign to
persuade elected officials about the many benefits of early
representation at the bail stage. Lawyers’ successful advocacy
translated to a reduced jail population; the resulting cost savings
coincided with the Bar’s vision of a more just, cost-efficient pretrial
system.52 The Bar also highlighted the discriminatory use of money
bail for economically-disadvantaged, disproportionately AfricanAmerican and Latino defendants.53 Delegate Kenneth C. Montague
introduced House Bill (HB) 1092 calling for immediate representation

46

See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1739.
Id. at 1729 n.41.
48
MD. RULE 4-216.2(c) (2014) calls upon administrative judges in each county to
“exercise supervision over the detention of defendants pending trial” and to seek
ways “to eliminate unnecessary detention.”
49
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1736.
50
See Penn, supra note 42.
51
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1765 n.134.
52
See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
53
See Colbert, supra note 36, at 42 (noting that a large number of people are
deprived of their freedom because they are poor); see also id. at 42 n.233 (discussing
how many pretrial inmates are unable to post low cash bails); see also Traci
Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 JUST.
Q. 170, 179 (2005) (finding that only forty-seven percent of African American and
thirty-three percent of Latinos are able to afford bail).
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at bail hearings on the last filing day in January 1998.54 He explained
that legislation for the public interest usually takes two to three years
to gain traction and majority support. Now the opportunity existed to
assess the bill’s strength and opposition, and to lay the foundation for
future passage.55 Proponents testifying for the bill included the
Maryland State Bar Association, the Chief Judge of the Court of
Special Appeals, Joseph F. Murphy, public safety (corrections)
officials, and Access to Justice Rule 16 student-lawyers and practicing
attorneys.56
The House Judiciary Committee, chaired by Delegate Joseph
F. Vallerio, Jr., since 1993, eventually defeated the bill by a 12-6 vote
during a contentious debate that revealed both expected and
unexpected opposition.57 The powerful bail bond industry remained
the chief opponent of passage.
It viewed counsel’s early
representation as harmful to business: bondsmen feared that judges
would release more represented detainees on recognizance or on nonfinancial conditions, thereby eliminating bondsmen’s substantial
revenue from the ten percent fees they collected from family and
friends of incarcerated defendants. Chair Vallerio maintained his
unwavering support for the current bond system, viewing public
defenders’ early representation as unnecessary and interfering with
private lawyers’ law practice. He felt that a pretrial agency
representative would provide judges with similar information and
would be an adequate substitute for defenders’ advocacy.58
Maryland’s Public Defender, Stephen E. Harris, also testified
in opposition to a bill that would have required his staff attorneys to
begin representation at indigent defendants’ first appearances. Though
proponents had conditioned legislative approval upon additional state

54

See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1765 n.133.
Id.
56
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1765 n.134, 1766 n.136.
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Id. at 1766 n.140.
58
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1766 n.138. Pretrial services exist in one half of
Maryland counties and assist judges in determining pretrial release or bail. Its
agents’ interview detainees, provide background information, and recommend bail or
release, based upon the defendant’s charge, prior convictions, failure(s) to appear
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funding, Public Defender Harris feared his lawyers would be
overburdened with additional responsibilities but without resources.
Harris questioned the testimony of Access to Justice Clinic students,
who had recounted the benefits of early representation for their
clients.59
C. The Lawyers at Bail (LAB) Project
During the legislative session, Marc Steiner, host of a National
Public Radio show, broadcast a one-hour program that discussed the
lengthy pretrial delay that ensued before the state assigned a lawyer .60
The State Attorney for Baltimore City, Patricia Jessamy, appeared
sympathetic, citing the unnecessarily long delay until an assigned
counsel’s appearance. Following the radio program, Robert Embry,
President of the Abell Foundation, communicated his interest in
exploring whether lawyers made a difference at the bail stage and
would reduce the cost of pretrial incarceration for people accused of
non-violent crimes.61
Six months later on August 25, 1998, the Abell-funded,
Lawyers at Bail (LAB) Project commenced. Attorney Chris Flohr
directed the program on a daily basis from the Baltimore City District
Court. Chris provided hands-on supervision of the twenty attorneys
whom we hired and trained, as well as the three paralegals who
conducted morning interviews of detainees.
Over the next eighteen months, LAB attorneys demonstrated
the difference an effective advocate made at bail review hearings
through the representation of 4,000 detainees. LAB succeeded in
gaining pretrial release for two out of three defendants, a substantial
increase that had an immediate impact on reducing the pretrial jail
population.62 Within nine months after LAB began, the population
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Law students Pace Duckenfield, Helen Lee, and Joe Key, and attorney Erin
Schaden, testified at the 1998 hearing.
60
Id. at 1737 n.75.
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For additional details, see Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1738 nn.80−81.
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was cut in half at Baltimore City’s Central Booking and Intake Center
detention facility, which had been operating at fifty percent over
capacity.63
When University of Maryland Professor Ray Paternoster later
analyzed the data,64 he concluded that LAB’s legal representation
accounted for the substantial difference in judges’ bail review
decisions: five times as many LAB clients gained pretrial release on
recognizance or on a reduced and affordable bail as similarly situated
defendants who did not have the benefit of a lawyer’s advocacy at
their bail review hearing.65 Professor Paternoster’s empirical
evaluation also identified additional benefits to early representation:
defendants believed they had received more procedural justice.66 That
is, they experienced more fairness, a meaningful right to
representation and voice, and a hearing where judges treated them
with greater respect.67 Such subjective benefits, Professor Paternoster
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Id. at 1722−23. The Lawyers at Bail Project’s six-month report to the Chief
Judges of Maryland’s Court of Appeals and District Court demonstrated the
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concluded, provided “legitimacy” to the bail proceeding and a greater
likelihood of compliance with the judicial ruling.68
University of Maryland economist Shawn Bushway added an
additional important dimension – cost savings – to the benefits of
representation at the beginning of a criminal prosecution. Bushway
showed that lawyers save taxpayers substantial money when
defendants facing non-violent charges avoid unnecessary pretrial
incarceration pending trial; his analysis demonstrated the “bed days”
saved when LAB defendants gained release.69 A legislative fiscal note
projected annual savings of $4.5 million in Baltimore City alone.70
While the empirical data and study would not become
available until 2001, proponents of the guarantee of legal
representation and pretrial reform made an impressive first-time
showing at the 1998 legislative session. Yet, their efforts failed to
overcome the stronghold that the bail bond industry had developed
with legislative allies in Annapolis. Advocates anticipated that the next
session in 1999 and thereafter, if necessary, would be their best hope
for legislative action ensuring a lawyer’s representation at the
beginning of a criminal prosecution. The following section describes
the reform efforts that would continue until 2002.
D. Close But No Cigar: Legislature Reform 1999 to 2002
1. A Reform Coalition’s Best Effort
If the 1998 legislative session provided a preliminary skirmish
between proponents of ensuring legal representation and defenders of
the status quo, then the 1999 and 2000 legislative battles represented
the main event which held surprise right up to the closing moments.
In assessing the 1998 session, proponents concluded that the
formidable House Judiciary Committee would be the biggest obstacle

68

See id. at 1762.
See id. at 1757 (“for every person given a lawyer at the bail hearing, we expect to
save about 10 bed days overall, and 6 bed days for people who, ultimately, have their
cases dropped.”). Id.
70
S.B. 0138, Reg. Sess., Fiscal Note (Md. 2000).
69

Colbert

2015]

MARYLAND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

25

to passing a reform bill. Finding the additional votes to overcome the
Chair’s opposition would be extremely challenging and virtually
impossible as long as the lead agency, the Office of the Public
Defender, continued its opposition. If proponents could survive the
House Judiciary Committee, though, it would bring the bill before the
entire elected House of Delegates where chances for a favorable vote
improved considerably. In the Maryland Senate, proponents viewed
the Judicial Proceedings Committee as evenly divided. They thought
the outcome depended upon the vote of the Chair, Senator Walter
Baker, and upon gaining the Public Defender’s support. Ideally,
proponents hoped that the Senate would be the first legislative body to
consider and then approve the bill, placing additional reason for House
Judiciary colleagues to join.
During the months leading up to the 1999 legislative session,
proponents took several steps toward addressing the Public Defender’s
concerns and building a strong coalition that favored counsel at bail
hearings. First, they looked for support from the executive branch.
The State Attorney General had been wary of taking a position where
potential litigation might develop and place the state in the unenviable
position of defending a suit that it favored but the statewide Public
Defender opposed. Proponents appreciated the dilemma; they agreed
to place litigation on the back burner while the legislature considered
the proposed bill.71 Additionally, the revised right to counsel bill
included specific language that satisfied the Public Defender’s concern
that representation required supplemental appropriation.72 Both
agreements accomplished proponents’ objective. The Public Defender
gave his support and thereafter, proponents gained the Governor’s
approval.73
Proponents created a broad coalition that included the principle
players within the justice system and outside legal community. Led by
the Maryland Bar Association and State Judiciary, the coalition soon
included the State Attorneys Association, State Police, Department of
Public Safety (Corrections), private and public criminal defense bar,
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and prominent members of the legal community.74 With this support,
proponents braced for the 1999 legislative session.
Senator Leo Greene, joined by three colleagues, introduced
Senate Bill (SB) 335 to the eleven-member Judicial Proceedings
Committee, which held the first hearing and would conduct the first
vote in late March.75 Delegate Montague, joined by fourteen cosponsors in the House, cross-filed House Bill 889 which was assigned
to the twenty-three-member House Judiciary Committee where he
assumed one of the leading positions. At the Senate Judicial
Proceedings hearing, proponents offered testimony from the principal
coalition members, as well as from prominent representatives of the
law enforcement community, including Maryland Attorney General
Joe Curran, former United States Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti,
and former United States Attorney for Maryland, Jervis Finney.76 Not
a single witness testified against the bill.
Proponents gathered, hoping for the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee’s passage, when the expected swing vote,
Chairman Walter Baker, voiced his approval during the Committee
hearing.77 Together with five other Committee colleagues who
previously indicated they favored the bill, it appeared that a majority
would approve the bill and forward it to the full Senate where strong
support awaited. However, as the vote neared, one of the bill’s most
vocal supporters, Clarence Mitchell IV, suddenly changed his position
and cast the decisive vote against SB 335. The Baltimore Sun
reported that Senator Mitchell was a licensed bail bondsman, who had
received a $10,000 loan two years earlier from bail bond companies
that remained unpaid at the time of his vote.78 The apparent quid pro
quo ended any hope for legislative reform in 1999.
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Reformers, though, scored an important victory when
Maryland Governor Glendenning provided financial funding for
public defenders’ early representation. The Governor dedicated
preliminary funding in fiscal year 2000 to Baltimore City defenders to
represent eligible defendants at bail review hearings.79 Beginning in
mid-July 1999, defenders extended representation at city review
hearings to sixty percent of eligible defendants; the Governor included
full funding in the 2001 budget.
Having twice witnessed the bail bondsmen’s behind-the-scenes
lobbying influence – first in the House Judiciary Committee in 1998
and then the following year in the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee – proponents braced for the unexpected as they moved
closer to their biggest battle in the 2000 legislative session. Though
the Governor considered the statewide legislation unnecessary after
having funded Baltimore city defenders,80 proponents offered
additional supporting testimony from the judiciary, prosecutors, bar
and law enforcement officials.81 They presented preliminary findings
from the LAB empirical study showing the substantial difference that
lawyers’ representation made for clients charged with non-violent
crimes: defendants with counsel gained release on recognizance twoand-one-half times more frequently than similarly-situated defendants
without counsel.82 Lawyers’ advocacy also persuaded judges to
reduce bail to a lower, affordable amount for an additional two-andone-half times as many represented clients. 83
LAB projected
substantial cost savings from the reduced pretrial population in the
Baltimore City jail.
The combined presentation proved persuasive. In March 2000,
the Senate Judicial Proceeding Committee approved Senate Bill 138
by a 6-4 margin with Senator Mitchell reversing his prior opposition
and providing the key swing vote. When the full Senate considered
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the legislation, Senators overwhelmingly voiced support by a 41-6
margin.
When the bill reached the House of Delegates, prospects for
passage appeared excellent. A majority of House Judiciary Committee
members had co-sponsored HB 889 and the full body of delegates
stood ready to act upon the committee’s approval. Yet, another
stunning development blocked House action: Chair Vallerio never
allowed the bill to surface for a vote. According to the bill’s
supporters, the Chair had invoked a legislative prerogative. He asked
committee members not to ask for a vote as a personal favor, citing his
devastation from the sudden, brutal killing of the wife of a close
associate, a bail bondsman.84 Colleagues honored the request and the
2000 session ended with no action taken. Several weeks later, the
same bondsman faced felony murder-related charges for hiring his
wife’s killer. Chair Vallerio represented him at the initial appearance
and bail review hearing.85
After the right to counsel legislation failed for a third time,
legislative reformers made one final push during the 2001 session.
Senate Bill 78 and House Bill 703 each called for public defender
representation to commence at an indigent defendant’s first
appearance. Once again, proponents presented strong evidence that
addressed the savings and cost of additional representation. They
turned to the favorable legislative fiscal note that estimated the
expense of hiring public defender lawyers at $898,000 for the first
year and rising to $1.3 million. That cost, proponents contended,
would be more than offset by the “potential significant decrease in
incarceration costs for local governments.”86 The fiscal note cited the
LAB empirical and economic study that predicted annual savings of

84

See id. at 1769 n.153–54 (citing Matthew Mosk, Chairman Opposes City Courts
Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1999, at 1A; Jaime Stockwell & David Nakumura, Md.
Bondsman Accused of Hiring D.C. Woman To Kill His Wife, Is Denied Bond, WASH.
POST, Apr. 29, 2000, at B3) (noting that Chair Vallerio prevented the bill from being
considered and made these remarks after returning from the funeral of the wife of
bail bondsman Dino Pantanzis).
85
See Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1769 n.154.
86
S.B. 78, Fiscal Note (Md. 2001), available at
mlis.state.md.us/2001rs/fnotes/bil_0008/sb0078.pdf.
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$4.5 million in Baltimore City alone.87 In addition, proponents’
witnesses included Milwaukee District Attorney Michael McCann, the
national president of the State Attorneys Association, as well as
Maryland’s former Attorney General and United States Attorney,
Stephen Sachs. Once again, though, the bill died in the House
Judiciary Committee.
Following the 2000 session, proponents’ reform measures
turned to a related area, namely judicial reliance on full money bond
that led many low-income defendants and families to seek the services
of a bail bondsman, who charged a non-refundable ten percent fee to
underwrite the bond amount payable in installments. Proponents
focused on providing detainees with a less harsh alternative than
spending their limited money to regain freedom; the ten percent cash
option permitted families to deposit the same amount with the court
and recover virtually all of it when the case concluded, as long as the
defendant reappeared when required. Once again, the bail bond
industry would flex its political muscle to defeat a challenge to its
near-monopoly on people regaining freedom before trial.
2. The High Court’s Advisory Committee: The Ten Percent
Cash Deposit
Following the 2000 legislative session in which the Chair of
the House Judiciary Committee blocked consideration of a guarantee
of counsel bill that Maryland Senators overwhelmingly approved, the
Chief Judge of Maryland’s highest court created the Pretrial Release
Project Advisory Committee.88 Chief Judge Robert M. Bell charged
its members with studying and proposing changes that would enhance
the state’s pretrial justice system. The broad-based membership
included judicial officers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, correction
officials and leading members of the Bar. Chaired by C. Carey
Deeley, the Advisory Committee met six times between July 2000 and
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Id. at 4.
See C. CAREY DEELEY JR., REPORT OF THE PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 5 (2001). The Honorable Robert M. Bell, Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals, created the Pretrial Release Project Advisory Committee on June
19, 2000. Id.
88
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July 2001, and produced a full report on October 11, 2001.89 The
report included nine recommendations that ranged from a statewide
pretrial release agency to monitor released defendants, counsel’s
guaranteed representation, judges’ sparing use of money bond, and a
mandatory ten percent cash deposit option.90 Committee Chair Deeley
delivered the collective work product to Chief Judge Bell, who
forwarded it to the Rules Committee on October 23, 2001, just months
before the 2002 legislative session commenced.
During the 2002 session, reformers relied upon the Advisory
Report when proposing an alternative, less onerous financial means for
economically-disadvantaged defendants and families to gain a loved
one’s release from jail. Instead of paying the commercial bondsman’s
fee, the proposed legislation offered by Senator Delores Kelly
permitted posting the same dollar amount with the court whenever
judicial officers ordered a money bond.91 Unlike bondsmen, court
officials returned the ten percent cash deposit (less a small
administrative fee) once the case concluded and the defendant
appeared as required. Proponents’ research revealed that defendants’
families often used money designated for rent, utilities and food to
cover the bondsman’s fee.92 The less onerous and refundable cash
deposit stood in contrast to the bondman’s non-refundable commercial
bail enterprise.
The proposed 2002 legislation modeled Maryland law.
Maryland Rule 4-216(c) entitles most people accused of crime to
pretrial release, either on personal recognizance or conditionally by

89

See id. The Committee met on July 18, 2000; August 22, 2000; September 12,
2000; December 11, 2000; January 9, 2001; April 30, 2001; and July 19, 2001. Id.
90
See id. at 2–3.
91
See MD. CODE ANN., Pretrial Release § 4-217 (West 2015). When a judge orders
$5,000 bond, the defendant may post the full $5,000 cash with the court and regain
the full amount when the defendant reappears and the case concludes. Few
defendants, however, possess $5,000 cash. A judge’s 10% cash percentage (deposit)
option enables the defendant to deposit $500 cash with the court and recover the
money (less a small administrative fee) after appearing in court and the case has
concluded.
92
See PRETRIAL RELEASE STUDY, supra note 19, at ii, ii n.5 (noting that seventy
percent of those interviewed in the study reported that paying the bondsmen’s fee
would result in a delay paying rent and utilities, and in buying less food).
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complying with a judicial order.93 When judicial officers include a
condition of release, Maryland law requires that they use the least
onerous condition.94 Since money represents the scarcest and harshest
commodity for indigent and low-income defendants, many stay in jail
because they lack the resources to pay a bondsman’s fee or to post
collateral as security. Although Maryland law provides for a
refundable ten percent cash deposit, judicial officers in most counties
refused to offer it. Maryland judicial officers, for example, who made
pretrial decisions for about sixty percent of the people arrested in 2000
and not released on recognizance, offered the ten percent cash option
to less than one out of twenty detainees;95 conversely, they ordered full
surety bond for nineteen out of twenty defendants.96 Most defendants
needed to engage a bondsman’s services and pay the fee to regain
pretrial liberty.
Proponents offered three different versions of the refundable
cash deposit option for legislators’ consideration. One mandated the
ten percent cash option whenever a judicial officer ordered money
bond; a second bill limited its use to bonds of $10,000 or less; a third
alternative mandated the ten percent cash deposit for non-violent and
less serious crimes only.97 Proponents argued that the ten percent

93

MD. CODE ANN., Pretrial Release § 4-216(c) (West 2015). “A defendant is entitled
to be released before verdict on personal recognizance or on bail, in either case with
or without conditions imposed, unless the judicial officer determines that no
condition of release will reasonably ensure (1) the appearance of the defendant as
required and (2) the safety of the alleged victim, another person, and the
community.” Id.
94
MD. CODE ANN., Pretrial Release § 4-216(e)(3) (West 2015). “If the judicial
officer determines that the defendant should be released other than on personal
recognizance without any additional conditions imposed, the judicial officer shall
impose on the defendant the least onerous condition [...].” Id.
95
See PRETRIAL RELEASE STUDY, supra note 19, at iv (noting that only three of 100
Maryland detainees not released on recognizance gained pretrial release by posting a
ten percent cash alternative).
96
See COMM. ADMIN. DAVID WEISSERT, MARYLAND DISTRICT COURT ANNUAL
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT (1998).
97
See H.B. 792, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2002rs/bills/hb/hb0792f.PDF; see also S.B. 432, 2002
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2002rs/bills/sb/sb0432f.PDF; see also S.B. 9, 2002 Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2002), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2002rs/bills/sb/sb0009f.PDF.
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deposit with the court provided a strong incentive for defendants to
return – they or their family would recover the much needed deposit.
Advocates explained that judicial officers’ infrequent use of the ten
percent option had the greatest impact on working and low-income
defendants; they had no choice but to pay the bondsman’s fee if they
wanted freedom. Detainees who could not pay remained in jail until
their case concluded.
Bondsmen viewed the ten percent cash deposit option through
a different lens: increased use by judicial officers meant fewer
financial bonds and a loss of significant revenue. Once again,
bondsmen found a sympathetic audience in the House Judiciary
Committee where members rejected all three bills that advocated for
the ten percent cash deposit. During the following legislative session
in 2003, proponents returned with new findings and recommendations
from the Deeley Committee,98 which had recommended the increased
use of ten percent cash deposit bond and restricted use of corporate
surety bonds. House Judiciary members, though, rejected these
proposed reforms, too. During the testimony, some legislators
suggested that the matter be considered by the Maryland Rules
Committee, a judicial body responsible for drafting procedural rules
and submitting them for approval to the Court of Appeals. Proponents
followed this suggestion.
3. Administrative Reform: Maryland Rules Committee 2002
to 2004
A frank assessment of the five-year, legislative reform effort
shows that proponents had failed to change the statewide practice of
denying counsel at indigent defendants’ initial appearance and had
seen other reform endeavors stymied. Despite building a powerful
coalition and presenting compelling statistical evidence, proponents
never overcame the “home field” advantage that the bail bond and

98

See PRETRIAL RELEASE STUDY, supra note 19, at 3 n.3. Court of Appeals Chief
Judge Robert Bell appointed Carey Deeley, a partner at Venable, Baetjer & Howard,
to chair the Pretrial Justice Committee. Statewide representatives throughout
Maryland included District Court commissioners, judges of the appellate and trial
courts, prosecuting and defense attorneys (private and public), public safety officers
(corrections) and sheriffs, and the Legal Aid Society. Id.
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insurance industry held with key legislators. In some years, it
appeared as though proponents might succeed in both legislative
houses. At those moments, though, reformers could almost count
upon a dramatic turn of events: a strong supporter would defect,
legislators leaning toward passage would discover a loss of personal
resolve after considering the consequences of defying a powerful
colleague or a behind-the-scenes agreement would trump what was
taking place publicly. Horse-trading favors – you vote for my favorite
bill and I will do the same for yours –, political might and lobbyists’
money interests remained integral to the legislative process.
On the brighter side, proponents could point to several positive
outcomes. They succeeded at the judicial level in guaranteeing earlier
representation to Baltimore City indigent defendants at bail review
hearings. Defendants’ wait time for their assigned public defender’s
advocacy could now be measured in days, rather than weeks following
arrest. Proponents’ reform measures also found support among an
unlikely coalition of partners – judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers,
corrections, the legal bar and police – as well as from many legislators
and public officials. Their efforts heightened public awareness about
one of the best-kept secrets within the justice system: it had functioned
without lawyers for the accused when poor people’s freedom was first
at stake.
Immediately after the House Judiciary Committee rejected an
alternative version of the ten percent cash deposit option, proponents
pursued the one remaining opportunity available: the Rules Committee
housed in the judiciary.99 Chaired by Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy,
Jr., of Maryland’s intermediate appellate court, the Court of Special
Appeals, the Rules Committee met and held public hearings beginning
on January 4, 2002, and continuing to the following Spring 2003.100

99

"To aid in the exercise of its rulemaking powers, the Court of Appeals may
appoint a standing committee of lawyers, judges, and other persons competent in
judicial practice, procedure or administration. A committee member shall serve
without compensation, but shall be reimbursed for traveling and other expenses
incurred on committee business.” MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 13-301
(LexisNexis 2014).
100
See Deeley, supra note 88; see also COURT OF APPEALS STANDING COMMITTEE
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (2002), available at
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Proponents and opponents vigorously debated the ten percent cash
bond as an alternative option to the full money bond. Proponents
argued the necessity of a mandatory “ten percent” bond because, aside
from two Maryland counties,101 very few judges and commissioners
provided the percentage option to financially limited defendants.
Proponents contended that the ten percent cash deposit option
provided a strong incentive for defendants to return to court.
Opponents countered that the full cash bond and a bail
bondsman’s intervention provided judges with a proven, reliable
method to assure the defendant’s presence in court. The Rules
Committee included Joe Vallerio, Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee, who had strongly defended the current system’s reliance
on bondsmen and who assumed the key role in defeating reform
legislation. Delegate Vallerio joined bail bondsmen in arguing
vigorously against expanding the ten percent bond. Let the judges
decide as a matter of discretion, they argued, a point that the
judiciary’s representatives shared as well.
In the end, the Rules Committee opposed the mandatory ten
percent cash deposit option where judicial officers ordered a full bond.
The Committee made one exception when judicial officers ordered
bonds of $2,500 or less. In these limited circumstances, the ten
percent cash option would automatically be available to defendants.
The Committee justified this decision by explaining that $2,500 bond
amounts usually apply to less serious, non-violent offenses.
In the months that followed, some District Court judges
indicated their opposition to the mandatory ten percent cash deposit
for $2,500 bonds and below. Students’ subsequent research revealed
that certain judges repeatedly ordered previously unseen bail amounts

http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/minutes/1-4-02.pdf (providing the minutes from
the January 4, 2002 Rules Committee meeting).
101
In Maryland’s most affluent counties, Howard and Montgomery judicial officers
consistently offered the ten percent option to roughly three out of ten defendants. In
contrast, Maryland judicial officers in the state’s poorest per capita income districts,
Baltimore City and Western Maryland, rarely made it available. The state’s largest
jurisdictions – Baltimore city, Baltimore County and Prince George’s – offered the
ten percent cash deposit for only one out of one hundred detainees.
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of $2,501, $2,600, $2,750 and $3,000,102 making defendants ineligible
for depositing the percent portion in court and recovering it once the
case concluded. These defendants had only one option for getting out
of jail: a family member or friend retained a commercial bondsman
and paid the ten percent non-refundable fee.
III. THE STRATEGY SHIFTS TO LITIGATION: THE RICHMOND CLASS
ACTION SUIT
A. Access to Justice Spring 2005: Jail Brochures and SelfRepresentation
The Fall 2005 Access to Justice Clinic students reflected upon
the preceding years of legislative and administrative reform endeavors.
Both the Maryland State Bar and the national American Bar
Association overwhelmingly approved resolutions calling upon states
and localities to guarantee counsel at the bail stage. The LAB findings
produced empirical data that demonstrated the substantial cost savings
and enhanced fairness for low-income defendants who had counsel’s
advocacy103 and led Maryland’s Governor to fund Baltimore City
defenders at bail review hearings.104 The Rules Committee’s approval
of judicial officers’ mandatory ten percent cash deposit for bonds
$2,500 and less made it possible for some people to recover bail
posted. Students also recognized that colleagues’ scholarly
contributions and media articles further educated the public, the bar
and elected officials; they better understood the legal basis for
extending the right to counsel and obtaining cost savings from a
decreased jail population. Law review articles, the Court of Appeals’
“Deeley” Pretrial Justice Report, the Paternoster/Bushway LAB study,
and opinion editorials and news articles had raised public awareness
about the importance of counsel, the impact of money bail on low-
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Remington Bronson, Joseph Cousins, Meredith Healy, Jamar Marcano, Eric
Menck, Aaron Naiman, Elizabeth Rosen, Brittany White, The Law in Practice: A
Draft Report on the State of Maryland’s Pretrial Justice System, Maryland School of
Law Access to Justice Clinic, 17, 25-26, App. Figures 12, 16, April 27, 2011; Healy
& Mancano, The Need for Lawyers at Bail Hearings Post DeWolfe v. Richmond 1921, April 30, 2012.
103
Colbert et. al., supra note 3, at 1720.
104
See id. at 1740 n.87 (discussing the Governor’s supplemental budget in 2001,
where he provided the public defender with funds for bail review representations).
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income, disproportionately people of color, and the bondsmen’s
powerful role in the criminal process.
That said, students reflected upon Maryland’s indigent
defendants who still remained without a lawyer when first appearing
before a commissioner and at the subsequent bail review hearing
before a judge. Left to fend for themselves, defendants frequently
stayed incarcerated for lack of bail money and 10% non-refundable
fees between $100 and $1,000. Two out of three defendants, typically
charged with non-violent crimes, ultimately learned that the charges
had been dismissed or would not be prosecuted.105 During their
pretrial incarceration, many suffered the loss of jobs, eviction from
homes, and an inability to care for family.106
The Spring 2005 Clinic students carried on the tradition of
representing individual detainees in Baltimore city and also traveled to
less populated suburban (Howard) and rural (Frederick) counties.
Their successes provided more evidence of counsel’s importance.
Students pondered what they could do for unrepresented defendants
and embarked on a statewide law reform project to produce an
information pamphlet for detainees. The pamphlet detailed the
process and law of pretrial release and explained what information
should be provided to a commissioner or judge. Obtaining permission
from the Maryland Department of Public Safety and local jail
wardens, students distributed 200,000 brochures to pretrial facilities
throughout the state over the next two years. This educational project,
which had the approval of the District Court and its judicial
committee, provided information about self-advocacy that helped
some detainees to regain liberty and avoid staying in jail at taxpayer
expense.
B. Spring 2006 Access to Justice Clinic: The Litigation
Strategy Begins
The next year’s entering class continued to represent and
obtain favorable rulings for incarcerated defendants at pre-review

105

See id. at 1722 n.3, 1763 (noting that many nonviolent charges are eventually
dismissed or not prosecuted).
106
See id. at 1722.
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hearings. But the advocacy experience challenged the Clinic students
to go much further and to consider a reform project that would address
the continued deficiency of denying counsel to an accused poor
person. Class discussions centered on a lawyer’s professional
responsibility to engage in activities that enhanced the administration
of justice for people unable to afford a private lawyer.107 Students
pondered what they could do to ensure legal representation at the first
appearance.
A return to the legislative arena was rejected. Reformers had
waged a valiant five-year effort and developed a formidable coalition,
yet could never overcome the power held by lobbyists for bondsmen
and insurance companies. Students concluded that the Governor and
executive branch could not be expected to allocate additional monies
to public defenders beyond Baltimore City. The cost of operating
local pretrial jails are the financial responsibility of counties, not the
state, and local officials had more pressing priorities than funding
lawyers for criminal defendants to address jail overcrowding.
Students considered the remaining alternative – litigation.
They reviewed what happened when this strategy was entertained at
the beginning of the reform effort in 1998.108 Indeed, a three-way
collaboration looked promising then, one that involved the Clinic, the
Maryland ACLU and the prestigious D.C. law firm Arnold & Porter,
which had represented Clarence Earl Gideon in his landmark ruling in
1963. Reformers, however, decided to put aside the adversarial
Dream Team litigation model and instead favored pursuing legislation
that focused upon coalition-building, educating legislators and seeking
changes in the Rules Committee.109

107

Part 6 of the Preamble of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct reads: “A
lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the
fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate
legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for
all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure
adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these
objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT: PREAMBLE & SCOPE (3) (1963).
108
Colbert et al., supra note 3, at 1764–65.
109
Id.
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The students now acknowledged the limits of that strategy and
began raising questions about litigation. Would the Clinic provide a
good vehicle for succeeding in a major lawsuit? The one-semester
Access to Justice Clinic anticipated new groups of students entering
and exiting once or twice a year. Even assuming students embraced
and continued the work of previous colleagues, they nevertheless had
a limited time constraint. How much could they do in a thirteen-week
semester? Students also questioned whether a lone clinical faculty
lawyer would be able to manage the suit. After discussion, they
concluded that it was unrealistic to expect a revolving group of
students and a professor to respond adequately to the considerable
resources of the State Attorney General and the vigorous defense
anticipated in favor of maintaining no representation. One student
asked whether we ought to look for support outside the Clinic. That
sounded like a prudent idea.
We considered the positives and negatives of “shopping” our
case to outside counsel. Students assessed the situation and concluded
that Rule 16 attorneys had distinguished themselves as advocates at
clients’ pre-review bail hearings. They knew more than most about
the reality of people waiting in jail for an assigned attorney and the
importance of counsel’s effective representation. They remained
concerned that at initial appearance hearings, no transcript or
recording reported what was said; no member of the public attended,
observed or spoke on the defendant’s behalf. Student-lawyers wanted
the Clinic to assume a significant role in the litigation.
But they could appreciate the benefits of a big firm’s
involvement. It had the resources, the attorneys and staff, and the
standing in the legal community to compete against the state’s lawyers
and probably a large firm representing the Public Defender’s Office.
Students asked the hard questions about collaboration, such as who
controls and makes strategic legal decisions during the litigation, the
firm or the clinic? How would that work? What role do clients
exercise? After exchanging ideas and thoughts, we agreed that
collaboration between the Clinic and pro bono attorneys had appeal
that outweighed our concerns. The search for potential law firms led
to a first meeting with Venable, Baetjer & Howard, whose lawyers had
previously prepared a white paper on a closely related issue
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concerning “preset bail” and the constitutional problems posed by
setting bail in absentia. There, students met two Venable partners,
Michael Schatzow and Mitchell Mirviss.
C. Collaborative Model: Venable’s Pro Bono Lawyers Meet
Clinical Students
In class, students had studied Maryland’s Preamble to its
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules themselves. They
learned about a lawyer’s multiple ethical obligations to the client, to
the court and to the public’s interest in ensuring fair and equal
justice.110 With this in mind, they prepared a presentation for a group
of Venable attorneys, unsure of whether the firm would commit to
embracing the project.
The students worked long hours preparing a ninety-minute
presentation, and it showed. They handled the questions and give-andtake exchange following the presentation with confidence and passion.
Several days later, Venable informed us that it had agreed to bring the
case pro bono and that it would work with the law students and the
Clinic to help develop and prepare the lawsuit. A more positive
response could not have been scripted. Students celebrated the
excellent news. They stood ready to assist the lawyers and to
communicate with incoming students, who would be entering the Fall
program. When the Spring 2006 semester concluded, they took pride
in what they had accomplished.
D. Richmond v. District Court of Maryland
Lots of planning goes into major law reform litigation,
including who to sue, what statutory and constitutional arguments to
pursue, and the type of judicial relief to seek – declaratory, mandamus,
compensatory – on behalf of individuals’ right to counsel and for the
class of indigent defendants seeking first appearance representation.
The unique blend of pro bono lawyers from Maryland’s largest firm

110

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1–1.18 (1963) (providing the rules
that govern the lawyer-client relationship); see also id. at R. 3.3–3.5 (providing rules
that govern the lawyer’s duties to the court).
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working with clinical students and their law professor provided the
ingredients for an exceptional collaboration.
The complaint included the District Court judges and
commissioners as the primary defendants. The legal arguments first
set forth a claim that the Maryland Public Defender Act and Maryland
Court of Appeals case law gave indigent defendants a statutory right to
counsel “at all stages” of a criminal proceeding, beginning at their
initial appearance; a second claim argued that the federal and state
constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel included the
“critical stage” of bail determination.111 Student teams researched
relevant case law that was incorporated into the memoranda of law.
As the semester moved forward, students grew more
comfortable in the student-lawyer’s law reform role. Many developed
a better understanding of how their assigned research fit within the
contemplated lawsuit. Yet I could see that the additional workload
had taken a toll on students meeting their other coursework and
responsibilities. They persevered and looked ahead to the target date
for filing the suit. On Monday, November 13, 2006, the City Clerk
accepted the Richmond v. District Court of Maryland complaint.
Afterwards, students reflected on the memorable experience of
working alongside top-flight lawyers, who produced a first-rate work
product. Indeed, they laid the foundation for what would become a
seven-year litigation battle.
E. Richmond I
The Venable attorneys had several rounds of dispositive
motions and argument in the Baltimore City Circuit Court that would
be followed with numerous briefs and oral arguments in the Court of
Appeals. In February 2007, the attorneys added a constitutional
ground for granting poor people’s right to a lawyer’s advocacy at the
initial bail and release determination, namely indigent defendants’
state and federal constitutional right to procedural due process. Years
later, in Richmond II,112 Maryland’s Court of Appeals would rely upon

111

Br. for Appellant, Quinton Richmond, et al. v. District Court of Maryland, 412
Md. 672 (2010).
112
434 Md. 444 (2013).
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this constitutional guarantee argument to declare that a poor person’s
entitlement to legal representation commenced at first appearance.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing
mootness and failure to state a claim.113 Plaintiffs responded by
moving for summary judgment.114 In May, Circuit Court Judge Stuart
Berger heard arguments; the following month, he denied the State’s
motion to dismiss and certified plaintiffs’ right to bring the class
action lawsuit.
In July 2007, the defendants from the judiciary cross-moved
for summary judgment. They argued, inter alia, that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel claim was rejected under existing
Maryland law, citing a Court of Appeals decision in Fenner v. State115
and an intermediate appellate court’s 1971 ruling in Hebron v. State116
that had rejected the bail-as-a-critical-stage argument. In October
2007, Circuit Court Judge Alfred Nance cited this case law and
granted the Attorney General’s cross-motion for summary
judgment.117 Plaintiffs appealed.
In 2008, the action shifted to Maryland’s appellate courts.
After plaintiffs filed their appellate brief in the intermediate Court of
Special Appeals in mid-July 2008, the Court of Appeals issued its own
writ of certiorari,118 meaning the high court intended to decide the case
directly from the lower court and bypass the intermediate appeals
court. The high court ordered briefs due six weeks later and set
argument for January 2009.
More than fifteen legal and human rights organizations
participated as amici and submitted briefs in support of indigent
defendants’ right to counsel at first appearance. They included the
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, the NAACP Legal

113

Reply Br. for Appellees, DeWolfe, et al. v. Richmond, 434 Md. 444 (2013).
Id.
115
846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004).
116
13 Md. App. 134 (1971).
117
Br. for Appellant at 6, Quinton Richmond, et al. v. District Court of Maryland,
412 Md. 672 (2010).
118
Richmond v. Dist. Ct. of Md., 990 A.2d 549 (Md. 2010).
114
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Defense Fund, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
the Society of American Law Teachers, as well as University of
Maryland and Baltimore law school professors and the Maryland
Public Justice Center.119
During the first week in January 2009, Mike Schatzow of
Venable appeared before the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued
plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional right to counsel. Fourteen
months later, in March 2010, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Office of the Public Defender was a necessary party and issued a per
curiam order that directed the Richmond plaintiffs to amend their
complaint in the Circuit Court to include the Public Defender as a
necessary party or accept dismissal.120 In April 2010, plaintiff
attorneys amended the complaint as directed to include the Public
Defender as a co-defendant, represented by Wilmer Hale partner, A.
Stephen Hut, Jr.
The next several months saw a flurry of activity. 121 Once
added to the case, the Public Defender agreed that plaintiffs had “very
strong constitutional and statutory claims” but urged the Circuit Court
to decline ordering implementation for six-to-nine months in order to
resolve budgetary constraints that would make implementation
“impractical.”122 After another attempt by the defendants to dismiss
the case in Circuit Court, Judge Nance invited both sides to submit
memoranda. In August, plaintiffs renewed their motion for summary
judgment.
In late September, Judge Nance issued a groundbreaking
decision and reversed his prior ruling, declaring that poor people’s
constitutional right to counsel and to due process guaranteed legal
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The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) national and Maryland chapter, the
Brennan Center for Justice, Center for Constitutional Rights, National Legal Aid &
Defender Association joined the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
brief. The International Cure, Alternative Direction, and the Justice Policy Institute
joined the Public Justice Center brief.
120
Richmond v. Dist. Ct. of Md., 990 A.2d 549, at 549 (Md. 2010).
121
For additional details of court proceedings, see Richmond I, 76 A.3d 962 (Md.
2012).
122
Id. at 969–70.
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representation when they first appeared before a judicial officer.123
Judge Nance specifically held that the initial appearance is a critical
stage that requires the State to provide counsel and that denying
counsel violates defendants’ due process rights. It would now be the
Attorney General’s turn to appeal.124
F. Richmond II
In March 2011, the Attorney General, representing the District
Court defendants, and the Public Defender filed timely appeals to the
Court of Special Appeals in the newly-captioned class action suit,
Paul DeWolfe et. al. v. Quinton Richmond.125 Plaintiffs petitioned the
Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari126 that would address the
Circuit Court’s right to counsel rulings.127 The Public Defender, too,
asked the Court of Appeals to consider an additional issue raised
below.128
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari “to address these
important questions”129 once again permitting a bypass of the
intermediate appellate court. Attention now turned to plaintiffs’ legal
brief and once again the legal community demonstrated the same
strong amicus support.
At oral argument, plaintiffs received
welcomed support for their legal position from one of the defendants,
the Public Defender, who agreed that the statutory and constitutional
due process arguments “are well taken.”130 The Attorney General,
meanwhile, maintained an aggressive defense of the status quo,

123

Id. at 970.
Id.
125
Id. at 962 (Md. 2012).
126
Richmond II, 21 A.3d 1063 (Md. 2011).
127
Richmond I, 76 A.3d at 972. Questions 1–4 focused upon indigent defendants’
statutory and constitutional right to counsel at initial bail hearings and when
commissioners impose “preset” bail ordered by district court judges in defendants’
absence. Questions 5 and 6 focused on the Circuit Court’s granting of declaratory
relief for statutory and constitutional violations and for denying injunctive relief. Id.
128
Id. The Public Defender asked whether the circuit court erred in ordering “the
declaration without in any way addressing remedy and how this undisputed funding
shortfall might be practicably addressed.” Id.
129
Id., citing Richmond II, 21 A.3d at 1063.
130
Richmond I, 76 A.3d 962, 970 (Md. 2012).
124
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namely, no right to legal representation for indigent defendants at the
bail stage.
On January 4, 2012, Judge Mary Ellen Barbera delivered the
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals.131 Relying exclusively
upon the Public Defender Act, the Court concluded that indigent
defendants’ statutory right to counsel included first appearance
hearings and bail review proceedings to protect individuals’ freedom
before trial.132 The judges agreed that “whenever a Commissioner
determines to set bail, the defendant stands a good chance of losing his
or her liberty, even if only for a brief time,” and that “the presence of
counsel…can be of assistance to the defendant.”133
The Court also cited an inter-disciplinary empirical study
showing that without a lawyer “unrepresented suspects are more likely
to have more perfunctory [bail] hearings, less likely to be released on
recognizance, more likely to have higher and unaffordable bail, and
more likely to serve longer detentions or to pay the expense of a bail
bondsman’s non-refundable ten percent fee to regain their
freedom.”134
The Court, by a 5 to 2 vote, also denied the Public Defender’s
request for a stay until funding is certain, saying “[w]e cannot declare
that Plaintiffs have a statutory right to counsel at bail hearings and in
the same breath, permit delay in the implementation.”135
To be sure, Richmond I was a stunning legal victory that
acknowledged the pretrial freedom rights of poor and low-income
defendants required the advocacy of a lawyer. Who would have

131

Id. at 962. Two judges concurred with the majority on most of the issues, but
dissented on whether to grant a stay to the Office of the Public Defender. Id.
132
Id. at 972 (“For the reasons that follow, we answer ‘yes’ to the first question
presented by the Plaintiffs and hold that they enjoy a right under the Public Defender
Act to be represented at any bail hearing conducted before a Commissioner. We
need not and therefore do not address the federal and state constitutional claims
presented by the Plaintiffs' second, third and fourth questions.”).
133
Id. at 977.
134
Id., citing Brief. of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 10-11, Richmond I, 76 A.3d
962 (Md. 2012) (Docket No), 2011 WL 4585688 at *10-11.
135
Richmond I, 76 A.3d at 983.
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imagined when it was filed more than five years earlier – or when
students began this venture fifteen years ago – that recognition of this
long overlooked right would one day be voiced by the seven judges on
the Court of Appeals? However, the celebration had barely begun
when legislators in the House and Senate filed bills to undo the
Court’s ruling.136 After all, the Richmond I ruling was based on the
Public Defender statute. Legislators therefore possessed the power to
reverse the Court of Appeals decision by repealing the statute’s
language to say that the right to counsel did not apply either at initial
hearings or bail reviews.
Other legislators, however, tempered this immediate reaction
against the Court of Appeals’ sweeping ruling. They, too, wanted to
make Richmond I a short-lived victory but sought to avoid a direct
confrontation and separation of powers clash with the judiciary, a coordinate branch of government. As the legislative session moved
toward its closing date in early April, legislators reached a
compromise. Consequently, the 2012 General Assembly session
concluded with legislation that overrode the Court of Appeals’
unanimous right to counsel at first appearance decision but maintained
representation at the subsequent bail review hearing. Legislators did
so by re-defining the Public Defender Act’s guarantee of counsel at
“all stages of a criminal proceeding” to commence only after the initial
appearance.137
Legislators were not alone in pushing back against the Court of
Appeals ruling. Executive branch officials also expressed opposition.
Within thirty days of the Richmond I decision, the Attorney General
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on behalf of the District Court
defendants and asked for an extended stay of implementation. At the
close of the session, the high court denied that motion. Public

136

See S.B. 165, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); see also H.B. 112, 2012 Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2012).
137
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2) (West 2012). This amended section
of the Public Defender Act(2)(i) now included representation at the bail review
hearing: “representation shall be provided to an indigent individual in all stages of a
proceeding . . . including, in criminal proceedings, custody, interrogation, bail
hearing before a District Court or circuit court judge, preliminary hearing,
arraignment, trial, and appeal.” Id.
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hearings

Over the remainder of 2012, various events led the Court of
Appeals to schedule a third round of oral argument. First, following
the legislative repeal of the Public Defender Act and the Court’s
refusal to reconsider its ruling, the District Court defendants and
Public Defender sought a Circuit Court hearing focused on
challenging immediate enforcement of Richmond I and finding ways
“a funding shortfall…might be practically addressed.”139
Plaintiffs responded by asking the Court of Appeals to grant a
writ of certiorari and decide the unresolved federal and state
constitutional arguments raised in Richmond I. At that time, the
judges had focused only upon indigent defendants’ statutory guarantee
based upon the “established principle that a court will not decide a
constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a nonconstitutional ground.” On August 22, 2012, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari and agreed to consider the state and federal due
process and critical stage constitutional issues and remedial relief.140
It ordered briefs filed in October and scheduled oral argument for
early January 2013.
In anticipation of the Court’s ruling, the 2013 legislative
session focused on pretrial justice reform measures, including the first
conversation about judicial officers employing an objective
assessment of defendants’ flight and safety risk, if released. The risk
assessment recommendation would assist judicial officers’ pretrial
release and bail determinations,141 and reduce the impact of money

138

Richmond II, 76 A.3d 1019, 1025 (Md. 2013).
Id. at 1024.
140
Id. at 1026. In granting certiorari, the Court denied defendants’ motion to remand
the case to the Circuit Court “for further development of the factual record,” adding
it was “unnecessary.” Id.
141
COMM’N TO REFORM MD.’S PRETRIAL SYS., FINAL REPORT 15 (2014), available
at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial-commissionfinal-report.pdf. “Pretrial risk is defined as the likelihood of committing another
crime or failing to appear in court[…]An effective pretrial program should make
recommendations to the court based on the findings of this risk assessment. These
139
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bail on economically disadvantaged defendants. Legislators also
introduced bills to expand police use of citations for non-violent
charges in lieu of custodial arrest.142 During the session, legislators
also expressed support for a Governor’s Pretrial Justice Committee
that would further study risk assessment, use of citations and bail
reform.143
House Judiciary Committee Chair Vallerio, meanwhile,
proposed a reform of a different kind. His bill challenged the accuracy
of public defenders’ assessment of prospective clients’ financial
eligibility. Believing that many should have been found ineligible and
been required to hire private counsel, Chair Vallerio proposed limiting
public defenders’ representation to a one-time only appearance at bail
review.144 Thereafter, representation would cease until the defendant
reapplied and recertified as eligible. Vallerio’s bill did not pass, but
would be reintroduced.145 Before legislators recessed in April, they
approved the Governor’s State Task Force to Study the Law and
Policies Relating to Representation of Indigent Defendants by the
Office of the Public Defender (hereinafter, “Public Defender Task
Force”). Soon thereafter, the Governor selected Public Defender Task
Force members and they commenced work during the summer and fall
months.
On September 25, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued its
decision in Richmond II.146 The Court declared that Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights guaranteed indigent defendants a
recommendations should be the least restrictive to reasonably ensure court
appearance and community safety.” Id. at 13–14.
142
See H.B. 742, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); see also S.B. 991, 2013 Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2013).
143
See REPORT TO THE PRETRIAL RELEASE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE TASK FORCE TO
STUDY THE LAWS AND POLICIES RELATING TO REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS BY THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER (Nov. 2013),
available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/pjireports/Report%20to%20the%20MD%20Pretrial%20Release%20Subcommittee%20
-%20PJI%202013.pdf. The Pretrial Justice Institute, a non-profit organization
focused on pretrial reform, authored the report and contributed to the discussion by
sharing their research on early representation, the benefits of risk-based decisionmaking, holistic pretrial systems and more, which can be found at www.pretrial.org.
144
H.B 153, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013).
145
Doug Colbert, Insecure Justice in Maryland, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 2013, at 17A.
146
Richmond II, 76 A.3d 1019 (Md. 2013).
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constitutionally protected, procedural due process right to counsel
when first appearing before a commissioner.147 The 4-3 decision
meant that an accused poor person now had the guarantee of a
lawyer’s representation and vigorous advocacy to protect his or her
liberty following arrest. The majority cited pretrial incarceration’s
“devastating effects on the arrested individuals” – loss of jobs, health
and safety risks, jail conditions148 – and referred to pretrial release
decisions where “bail amounts are often improperly affected by
race.”149 It concluded that a lawyer’s representation following the
commissioner’s ruling came too late and did “not cure”150 the denial of
counsel at first appearances where reviewing judges did “not often
change [the amount].”151
Following Richmond II’s constitutional right to counsel
mandate, the State of Maryland152 petitioned the Court to recall the
mandate. Two days later on October 25, 2013, the State filed two
other motions: it asked the Court of Appeals to stay its ruling until
after the legislative session concluded and it filed a Motion for
Reconsideration where it sought to reargue the merits of the
constitutional right to counsel ruling.153 On November 6, the Court of
Appeals denied each of the State’s three motions.154 The Court
remanded the case to the lower Circuit Court with directions to enter a
declaratory judgment. The Court of Appeals attached a proposed
Order that informed the parties that the Circuit Court would be the
proper forum for raising issues related to implementation, such as
defendants needing more time.155

147

Id.
Id. at 1023.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1029 (“As a matter of Maryland constitutional law where there is a
violation of certain procedural constitutional rights of the defendant at an initial
proceeding, including the right to counsel, the violation is not cured by granting the
right at a subsequent appeal or review proceeding.”) (emphasis added).
151
Id. at 1022–23.
152
76 A.3d at 1021, n.1. Following Richmond I, the Court of Appeals granted the
State of Maryland’s motion to intervene as an interested party. Id.
153
Id. at 1035.
154
Id.
155
Id. The Court of Appeals Order referred to the State of Maryland requesting time
to comply with Richmond II’s declaratory judgment and stated that “any arguments
by the parties may be made in the Circuit Court if, and when, any party files in the
148
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The Court of Appeals moved forward with implementation of
Richmond II’s constitutional guarantee to counsel at first appearance.
In late November, Chief Judge Barbera delivered an Administrative
Order that directed District Court administrative judges to identify
appointed panel attorneys, who would be available for
representation.156 In December, Richmond attorneys moved for
injunctive relief to compel the District Court to provide counsel, a
motion the Circuit Court granted in early January 2014.157 When the
Chief Judge of the District Court indicated his readiness, signs pointed
to imminent implementation.158 But that quickly changed when the
Attorney General, representing the District Court defendants,
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a stay and writ of certiorari.159 On
January 23, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted a temporary stay that
would later be extended to July 1, 2014.160
The 2014 legislative session devoted considerable attention to
the Richmond rulings. From the moment the session began, political
leaders voiced opposition and openly expressed hope that the Court of
Appeals would revisit Richmond II. On a live public radio program,
Governor Martin O’Malley first hinted, and then Senate President
Mike Miller boldly predicted that the Court of Appeals would grant

Circuit Court an application for ‘[f]urther relief based on [the] declaratory
judgment.’” Id.
156
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR ATTORNEYS
REPRESENTING INDIGENT DEFENDANTS AT INITIAL APPEARANCES BEFORE DISTRICT
COURT COMMISSIONERS 2 (2013), available at
http://www.courts.state.md.us/adminorders/20131126attorneyappointmentprocessrep
resentingindigentdefendants.pdf.
157
Brief of Appellants, Ben C. Clyburn, v. Quinton Richmond, at 15 (No. 105)
(2013).
158
Id. Chief Judge Clyburn had indicated the District Court’s readiness to provide
counsel at first appearances at the January meeting of the Maryland Rules
Committee. Steve Lash, Top Court Won’t Stay Lawyers-At-Bail Ruling, DAILY
RECORD (Nov. 6, 2013). On February 12, 2014, the Chief Judge reiterated that “the
District Court was ready to go” and had lists of lawyers ready to provide
representation.
159
See supra note 156. On January 10 and 13, 2014, the Attorney General moved
for a writ of certiorari, and to enjoin and stay the Circuit Court’s granting of
immediate Richmond relief.
160
Order, Ben C .Clyburn v. Quinton Richmond, (No. 105), (Md. 2013), available at
http://www.mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2014/105a13.pdf.
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the State’s motion to reconsider and overrule Richmond II.161 Each
public official made reference to changes in the Court’s membership
as reason for their optimism.162 During the legislative session, Senator
Zirkin, a member of the Judicial Proceedings Committee, offered a bill
that called for a public referendum to overrule Richmond II and
eliminate poor people’s constitutional right to counsel.163 Senator
Zirkin also opposed a bill sponsored by the Chair of Judicial
Proceedings, Senator Brian Frosh, which incorporated the Governor’s
Task Force recommendations for risk assessment, a statewide pretrial
services agency and elimination of cash bail.164
While the Senate overwhelmingly rejected the public
referendum bill and approved Senator Frosh’s risk assessment
proposal,165 the legislation fared badly when presented to the House
Judiciary Committee. Both the Chair and a majority of members
indicated their opposition both to risk assessment and to funding the
Public Defender to represent indigent defendants at first appearance.
As the 2014 legislature reached its final days, legislators agreed on a
temporary solution. The Judiciary budget would provide ten million
dollars to fund private attorneys’ representation of certified indigent
defendants.166 Legislators also approved the Governor’s Commission
to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System.167
When the Richmond II parties returned to the Maryland Court
of Appeals on May 6, 2014, they appeared more in agreement than at
any other time since litigation commenced seven-and-a-half years

161

Michael Dresser, O’Malley, Miller Don’t See High Court Ruling as Final, BALT.
SUN, (Jan. 8, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-01-08/news/bs-mdsession-steiner-20140108_1_appeals-court-mike-miller-appeals-decision.
162
Id.
163
See S.B. 1144, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/fnotes/bil_0004/sb1114.pdf.
164
See H.B. 973, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/sb/sb0973T.pdf,
165
See Nick Tabor, Md. Senate Advances ‘Moneyball’ Bail System Bill, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/28/senateadvances-moneyball-bail-system-bill/.
166
FINAL REPORT, COMMISSION TO REFORM MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM 1, 9,
2014, available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrialcommission-final-report.pdf.
167
Md. Code Regs. 01.01.2014.08 (May 27, 2014).
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earlier.168 Both shared the principle of compliance with the Richmond
II guarantee of counsel once the Court approved the Rules
Committee’s revision. The defendants, however, seemed more
interested in plaintiffs relying on their “good will and good faith” than
providing a date certain for implementation. Plaintiffs insisted upon
the firm date of July 1, 2014, when the ten million dollar funding
became available for providing counsel to Baltimore City defendants
and offered flexibility in other jurisdictions. At the Rules Committee
meeting on May 27, 2014, members heard from the interested parties
and finally decided that statewide implementation would commence
on July 1.169
IV. CONCLUSION
On July 1, 2014, more than sixteen years after the first Clinic
students enrolled in the Access to Justice Clinic, Richmond panel
attorneys began representing Maryland indigent defendants at initial
appearances before District Court Commissioners. Five months later,
the Governor’s Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System
reported that lawyers’ representation made a substantial difference:
roughly seventy percent of represented detainees gained pretrial
release at initial appearance, substantially higher than the previous
fifty percent of unrepresented defendants who had regained their

168

Plaintiffs’ brief explained their position of seeking injunctive relief, should the
defendants delay implementation. “This case has had far too many delays and
detours for the Court to accept the [defendants’] vague promise of future compliance
at face value. They have fought implementation tooth and nail for the last seven
months, to the point of taking positions in this Court that flatly contradicted repeated
public statements by Chief Judge Clyburn that the [defendants] were ready to move
forward. If the [defendants] do not want to be subject to an injunction, they should
be clear and specific as to the dates when full implementation will occur in each
jurisdiction.” Brief for Appellees, Ben C. Clyburn v. Quinton Richmond, (No. 105)
2013, available at
http://courts.state.md.us/coappeals/highlightedcases/richmond/Brief%20of%20Appe
llees.pdf.
169
RULES ORDER, COURT OF APPEALS STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (May 27, 2014), available at
http://mdcourts.gov/rules/rodocs/183ro.pdf.
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liberty.170 Considering that most arrestees are charged with nonviolent crimes,171 the reduced expense of pretrial incarceration resulted
in significant savings.
Richmond’s judicially-administered right to counsel panel,
however, encountered difficult issues. Perhaps the most disturbing
involved the percentage of indigent defendants who waived their right
to counsel. According to the final report of the Governor’s
Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System, an exceedingly
high proportion of defendants— between forty to ninety percent—
chose to appear without a lawyer.172 One reason identified by the
Commission was the delay in waiting for an assigned lawyer. 173 Panel
lawyers also raised issues about the attorney selection process and
insufficiency of selection standards, the limited training they received,
the difficulties encountered in conducting jail interviews and
maintaining client confidentiality, and the inability to forward clients’
information to public defenders for representation at the next bail
review hearing.174

170

FINAL REPORT, COMMISSION TO REFORM MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM 1, 18,
2014, available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrialcommission-final-report.pdf.
171
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
172
The Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System released its final report
on December 19, 2014. During a random week between November 14-20, 2014, a
statewide survey showed that three out of five Maryland defendants waived counsel.
FINAL REPORT, COMMISSION TO REFORM MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM 1, 10,
2014, available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrialcommission-final-report.pdf.
173
In counties where panel attorneys appeared for a limited period each day of four,
five or eight hours, defendants’ waiver rates often exceeded eighty percent. Id. at 9.
The lowest waiver rates usually occurred in jurisdictions which assigned defense
lawyers 24/7, such as Baltimore City, Prince George’s and Montgomery counties.
Additionally, defendants’ waivers occur without having seen or spoken to the
assigned attorney before appearing at the closed commissioner’s hearing that
determines eligibility. Once found eligible, detainees are given the choice of
requesting an attorney and returning to their cells for hours or until the next day to
wait for a lawyer, or proceeding to an immediate hearing without counsel. MD. R.
4-216.1.
174
See Steve Lash, Pretrial Issues on Lawmakers’ Docket, DAILY RECORD (Dec. 7,
2014).
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Renewed hope for reform grew with the anticipated work of
the twenty-three member Governor’s Commission. Beginning in July,
the Commission met five times and its three subcommittees –
Managing Public Safety through Risk-Based Decision Making,
Pretrial System Improvement, and Individual Rights and Collateral
Consequences – held five additional meetings. On December 19,
2014, the Commission issued a comprehensive report and highlighted
fourteen recommendations, including a statewide pretrial services
agency to supervise released defendants and administer a risk
assessment determination, pilot programs to evaluate risk assessment
and the results of representation, and the elimination of money bail
and commercial bondsmen.175 Proponents anticipated presenting their
recommendations at the upcoming legislative session. They would be
disappointed.
As the January 2015 session opened, legislators filed ten bills
that opposed Richmond’s right to counsel and supported bail
bondsmen and money bond. Some bills argued for a constitutional
amendment and a citizen referendum to eliminate Richmond’s
mandate.176 Others limited public defenders representation to the oneday bail hearing and questioned the integrity of their eligibility
process.177 These proposed bills would terminate legal representation
for indigent defendants until they reapplied and received eligibility
recertification.
Other legislation proposed extending the first
appearance hearing from twenty-four to forty-eight hours before being
brought before a judicial officer, enhancing bail bondsmen’s power to
avoid paying the forfeited bond, and authorizing judges to order
“preset” bail for defendants who failed to appear in court. Aside from
seeking the collection of data,178 legislators ignored the remaining
thirteen recommendations of the Governor’s Commission.

175

See supra note 172.
See H.B. 0496, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0496F.pdf.
177
See H.B. 0530, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015), available at
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0530F.pdf.
178
Proposed legislation sponsored by Delegate Jill Carter and co-sponsored by eight
colleagues included an information gathering bill that reflected Recommendation
Thirteen’s call for the collection of data. See H.B. 0357, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014),
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0397F.pdf.
176
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No one should doubt the continuing challenges that lie ahead
toward reforming Maryland’s pretrial justice system. During the past
seventeen years, every successful venture resulted in opponents
renewed efforts to reverse the change. The topsy-turvy, up-and-down
road of reform recalls the memorable words of the beloved
philosopher, Yogi Berra, who always reminded that “it ain’t over till
it’s over.”
One item, though, remains certain: reform requires
collaboration. The work of clinical students and members of the legal
community made legislative and administrative change possible.
Richmond’s legal and constitutional victories required the dedication
and persistence of Venable’s pro bono lawyers and the law school
clinic, and the support of the amicus public interest community. With
a sustained and collective effort that includes the voices of people
believing in a fair and just pretrial system, Gideon’s guarantee of
counsel for poor and low-income defendants at the beginning of a
criminal prosecution will become a permanent reality.

